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Abstract—Software-Defined Networking (SDN) has emerged as
a novel network architectural model that facilitates management
of large-scale networks, enables efficient network virtualization
and scalable network multi-tenancy. Centralized network con-
trollers, an important component in the SDN paradigm, deploy on
the data plane devices network policies from several independent
sources, defined based on a global network view. While this
approach allows to efficiently manage network connectivity and
reduce the time and cost of deploying new configurations, it also
increases the risk for errors – either introduced by accident,
through a combination with previous policies, or by a motivated
adversary. In this position paper we review the state of the art
for network policy verification for SDN deployments, identify
existing challenges and outline a secure framework for network
policy management in SDN deployments. Combined with existing
work on cloud platform and storage security, this will contribute
towards creating secure and trusted cloud deployments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid proliferation of web services and cloud computing
has triggered a remarkable increase in the number of data
centers which rely on virtualization to allow infrastructure
providers multiplex physical resources and provide complete
platform and network resources to multiple tenants. Such
platform resources are used as building blocks for increas-
ingly complex network deployments necessary to support a
multitude of web services. Along with enabling more ad-
vanced functionality, such complex network deployments also
introduce intricate errors which command time and significant
amounts of resources for investigation and resolution [1], [2],
[3], [4]. As a result, cloud tenants may suffer business losses
due to service outage, waste cloud resources and even lose
valuable data.
The software-defined network model (SDN) emerged and
rapidly evolved in response to the increasing complexity of
network deployments, allowing to facilitate operation and
management of cloud-grade networks [5], [6], [7], [8], [9],
[10], [11]. The operational advantages of the SDN model
lead to its increasing adoption in enterprise-grade network
deployments on a global scale [12].
A conceptual model of the SDN architecture is depicted in
Figure 1 and described below based on the SDN architectural
model presented in [11].
• The data plane contains both hardware and software rout-
ing equipment. This component implements the routing
policies that satisfy the goals of the network administra-
tor. It lacks decision logic and is optimized for forwarding
speed. Packets that do not match any policy are either
discarded or communicated to the control plane through
the southbound API.
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Fig. 1. High-level overview of the SDN architectural model
• Southbound API is a vendor-agnostic set of instructions
implemented by the routing equipment on the data plane.
It allows bi-directional communication between the data
and the control planes.
• Control plane is a logically distributed abstraction layer
that transforms high-level network operator goals into
discrete routing policies based on a global network view.
It contains a distributed network operating system, which
builds and maintains the global network view as well
as communicates with the equipment on the data plane.
The control plane also includes the network hypervisor,
which multiplexes the available network resources among
multiple users with distinct virtual network topologies.
• Management applications are used by network adminis-
trators to express their network configuration goals using
a set of high-level comments. They could also include
software-based network management components such as
firewalls, intrusion detection systems, traffic shapers, etc.
In the process of operating the SDN deployment, the
logically centralized control plane constructs a global view of
the network components in its domain. This allows network
management programs to rely on simpler graph processing
algorithms to compute the shortest paths and to operate with
higher-level abstractions, network operation is steered through
network policies originating from three sources:
• High-level goals expressed by the network administrator
and compiled into low-level configuration instructions for
data-plane devices.
• Network management applications implemented as soft-
ware components – included in the umbrella term network
function virtualization (NFV) – which issue policies to
implement their network functionality, e.g. as firewalls,
traffic shapers, load balancers, instrusion detection de-
vices and other functionality traditionally implemented
in network middleboxes.
• Network operating systems (e.g. as described in [13],
[14], [15], [16]), which may independently generate
network policies in order to ensure network liveness
properties in the face of unexpected events (e.g. severe
traffic anomalies or a DDoS attack on a subset of network
components).
The constant stream of policies from the sources described
above – implemented by the network controller in a centralized
manner throughout the deployment – leads to a continuous
evolution of the network state. This situation leads to a new
type of network configuration problems, since such network
policies may have competing or conflicting effects on the data
routing. In a security context, such network policy conflicts
can lead to data leaks and isolation breaches in multi-tenant
SDN environments. Thus, new algorithms are required for
both static and run-time verification of network configuration
against policy invariants.
Similar problems – such as static network reachability
analysis or analysis of security policies for some protocols
– have been studied before [17], [18], triggered by the in-
creasing complexity of network deployments. However, such
approaches are not fully applicable to large-scale SDN deploy-
ments due to their limited scalability and focus on low-level,
protocol-specific details. More recent work [19], [20], [21],
[22], [23] focused on SDN deployments and described tar-
geted approaches for policy and topology verification against
invariants defined by network administrators.
Finally, [24] proposed a security-enforcement kernel for
network controllers that addresses challenges such as enabling
application co-existence, detecting and resolving conflicts
between incoming candidate flow rules and existing flow
rules, creating an application permission model introducing
application accountability and enforcing privilege separation.
Along with the rapid evolution of the state of the art in
network policy verification and enforcement for SDN deploy-
ments and rapid progress towards mature and secure SDN
controllers, a range of challenging problems and gaps continue
to persist. Examples of such challenges are verifying live-
ness network properties (currently ignored in favor or safety
properties), verifying policy composition for out-of-order rule
installations, developing a model for non-interference among
co-resident applications, as well as creating a sandboxing
model for NFV applications interacting with the network
operating system.
A. Contribution
In this paper, we outline the need for an integrated secure
framework for creation, verification and enforcement of SDN
policies. We review the current approaches for policy verifica-
tion in SDN deployments, discuss their strengths and identify
limitations that remain to be addressed. Finally, we outline
a framework for secure SDN policy creation, verification
and enforcement with access control for sandboxing of SDN
management applications. This preliminary design will serve
as an input for a comprehensive security architecture for SDN
infrastructure.
B. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we discuss the state of the art in network state verification in
SDN. Next, in Section III we summarize the most important
limitations and gaps identified earlier. In Section IV we outline
an architecture for secure SDN verification and enforcement.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V.
II. STATE OF THE ART
In this section we describe the relevant related work to
network policy verification for SDN deployments.
In [19], the authors of “Anteater” note that verifying net-
work correctness in the data plane offers several advantages
over verifying higher-level code such as configuration files and
use static analysis of network device forwarding information
bases to uncover problems in the data plane. Thus, Anteater
converts the data plane information into boolean expressions,
translates network invariants into instances of boolean satisfia-
bility (SAT) problems, and checks the resultant SAT formulas
using a SAT solver to check for violations of key network
invariants, such as absence of routing loops and black holes.
The approach in [19] is an “offline”, static approach and aims
to analyze a snapshot of the data plane. Hence, while it can be
used for complementary static checks, it does not scale well to
dynamic changes in the network and requires up to hundreds
of seconds to check a single invariant.
Symbolic execution can catch bugs through exploration of
all possible code paths but it is usually not tractable for large
software. NICE [21] combines model checking, symbolic exe-
cution and search strategies to test unmodified controller pro-
grams by automatically generating carefully-crafted streams of
packets under many possible event interleavings. In particular,
it performs symbolic execution of OpenFlow applications
and applies model checking to explore the state space of
an entire OpenFlow network. NICE is a proactive approach
that attempts to identify invalid system states by using a
simplified OpenFlow switch model. An implementation of
NICE reported in [21] has found 11 bugs in the network
topology which were caused by software components part of
the SDN controller. Among the limitations of NICE is the
implicit assumption that all packets reach the controller – thus
excluding the cases of total or partial packet loss in a given
equivalence class. Omitting these cases leads to a loss in both
coverage and efficiency of the tool. Likewise, while focusing
on symbolic execution of each event handler, NICE does not
check the dependencies between handler invocations. A third
shortcoming is the loss in coverage resulting from throttling
the input that can modify the controller state. While this is
done to prevent infinite execution trees – which arise in NICE
when each state has at least one input that limits the controller
state – it further distances the model tested by NICE from the
complexity of an SDN deployment. Finally, while NICE is
not suitable for run-time policy verification, it can be used for
static verification of the network.
Another static verification approach is described in [22],
which uses header space analysis to statically check network
specifications and configurations to identify certain classes of
failures, such as reachability failures, forwarding looks, traffic
isolation and leakage problems. In the context of multi-tenant
SDN networks, such static checking can detect issues that
can lead to breach of inter-tenant isolation. The header space
framework used in this approach is built on a geometric model,
with packets modeled as points in a geometric space and net-
work boxes as transfer functions on the same geometric space,
such as the header space, network space and slice network
space. The analysis uses set operations – such as intersection,
union, complementation and difference – in order to determine
the interaction between different spaces and identify potential
issues. While the approach has been implemented and tested
on an enterprise network, it maintains the limitations of [21]
since the approach in [22] can only be applied to snapshots
of the system. In addition, header space analysis identifies the
existence of issues, but stops short of listing their potential
causes, such a specific policy or set of policies applied earlier.
Some of the shortcomings of [21], [22] have been addressed
in [20], which proposed an approach for verifying network-
wide invariants in real-time. The authors aim to prevent
network bugs by verifying each change in the networking
behaviour before it takes effect and block changes that violate
important invariants. To do this, they introduce “VerfiFlow”,
a layer between the SDN controller and network devices
that checks for network-wide invariants dynamically as each
forwarding rule is inserted, modified or deleted. To check
network-wide invariants in large networks and in the presence
of complex forwarding elements, “VeriFlow” introduces a
series of adaptations. First, it monitors all network update
events in the live network as they are generated by network
control applications, devices, or the network operator. Second,
it confines the verification activities exclusively to the parts of
the network that may be influenced by the new update. Third,
“VeriFlow” uses a custom algorithm for invariant checking
rather than utilizing general-purpose SAT or binary decision
diagram solvers. While “VeriFlow” represents an important
step forward from the static network checking to real-time
verification of network invariants well-suited for SDN deploy-
ments, it contains a series of limitations. First, “VeriFlow”
does not distinguish between temporary invariant violations
(e.g. occuring in an intermediate state while applying multiple
policies), or “actual” violations (induced by mistake or by an
adversary). This can lead to a large number of false positive
violations identified. Second, “VeriFlow” does not consider
SET action commands present in certain southbound APIs
(e.g. OpenFlow) and empowers apps to instruct a switch to
rewrite the header attributed of a matching flow. As a result,
it fails to handle recursive flow rule logic chains established
by virtual circuits [24].
A different, equally important aspect is handling enforce-
ment of the rules and sandboxing of the network management
applications.
In “Rosemary: A Robust, Secure, and High-Performance
Network Operating System” [16], the authors present a net-
work operating system focusing on network resilience in
the presence of faulty or malicious applications by creating
sandboxed environments for network applications. Sandbox-
ing (also called micro-NOS) is achieved by launching each
application in a separate process context with access to all of
the libraries that the application requires. Each Micro-NOS
also contains a resource monitor to supervise the applications
and operates within the permission structure of Rosemary
network operating system. In turn, the Rosemary network
operating system is an application running on a commodity
Linux distribution. The isolation offered by the micro-NOS
allows to improve robustness, such that faulty or malicious
applications are prevented from crashing the entire network
operating system. Furthermore, the paper also aims to ad-
dress security aspects in order to prevent malicious network
applications from accessing internal data structures of other
network applications. This is achieved by implementing an
AppZone sandbox, where privileged system calls made by a
network application are interposed and verified by the sandbox
framework. To avoid the declared ‘20-30%’ performance over-
head, the authors recommend two optimisations called ‘request
pipelining’ and ‘trusted execution’. The latter in essence
removes the sandbox isolation, allowing the application to
run as a kernel process; however, this makes the security
advantages of Rosemary less evident. Finally, the authors
present the performance evaluation results, which show that
the Rosemary network operating system performs roughly on
par with the NOX [13] approach on a 1G link and can perform
on par with NOX on a 10G link with the ‘trusted execution’
optimisation in place. This contribution highlights the need
for improved security in the architectures of the proposed
network operating system. However, one major drawback of
the proposed approach is that it ignores distribution aspects,
despite significant progresses in distributed network operating
system design [14] and the demonstrated need for physical
distribution of the control plane [12].
III. CHALLENGES
In this section, based on the partial review of the state of
the art in Section II, we outline the list of existing challenges
for policy verification and enforcement in SDN deployments.
a) Verification of liveness properties: current approaches
to SDN policy verification focus on safety properties, e.g. that
a certain packet can not reach a certain endpoint. However,
run-time verification of liveness properties – e.g. that intended
packets can reach legitimate targets, even after new policies
have been applied, must also be done, in order to avoid
intended or even accidental denial-of-service.
b) Interleaved execution: similarly, current approaches
assume that events are executed atomically, i.e. that policies
are installed atomically throughout the deployment. Such
approaches do not consider intrleavings and out-of-order rule
installations, which could introduce new bugs or be exploited
by adversaries. Thus, future solutions should also consider
non-atomic policy installations.
c) Determining verification time: as noted in the discus-
sion of “VeriFlow” [20] in Section II, premature verification of
invariant violation – done over an intermediate state occurring
while a set of policies is applied – may lead to multiple false
positives. An alternative approach, such as the one adopted
in [24] is to perform the verification after the entire set of
policies has been applied; however, this may lead to temporary
isolation violation between tenants. Future solutions must
address this issue by eliminating the risk for network isolation
breaches without triggering unsustainable volumes of false
positives.
d) Enforcing non-interference: current approaches fo-
cusing on policy verification do not enforce non-interference
between applications. In particular, the approach in [24] ex-
plicitly allows applications to override each other depending
on their authorization. Future solutions must identify a suitable
privilege model that would enforce non-interference between
network applications without limiting network functionality.
e) Sandboxing network applications: while application
sandboxing has not been the focus of earlier approaches,
more recent contributions address the need to separate network
applications from the SDN controller context ([16], [24]).
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is currently no
access control model designed to account for the specifics
of network operating systems. Thus, future solutions should
contain an access control model for network operating sys-
tems applicable to SDN deployments that would not induce
prohibitive performance penalties as reported in [16].
IV. SECURE SDN DEPLOYMENTS
In this section, we briefly outline a secure framework for
network policy management in SDN deployments. Combined
with existing work on trusted virtual machine launch [25]
and secure cloud storage [26], this will contribute towards
creating a secure cloud architecture capable of providing to
cloud tenants explicit security guarantees regarding platform
integrity, storage confidentiality and network isolation, and
even help address more complex problems such as cloud data
geolocation [27], [28].
Figure 2 shows a high-level representation of an SDN
deployment architecture, extended with several components
– namely the real-time policy checker and the offline policy
checker.
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Fig. 2. High-level overview of the proposed SDN policy verification
framework
Real-time policy checker: as the name suggests, the main
task of this component is to conduct continuous real-time
verification of the network policies (based on the approaches
in [20], [24]) issued from the expected sources, as listed
in Section I. In addition, this component is responsible for
origin tagging of the policies, such that each issued policy
can be traced to the issuing component. After a real-time
verification, accepted policies are forwarded to the controller
for deployment on the data plane devices. All information
about the incoming, accepted and rejected policies (including
their origin and execution context) is stored in a database
for secondary, periodic analysis by the offline policy checker
described below.
Offline policy checker: contrary to the Real-time policy
checker, the offline policy checker conducts periodic, static
verification of the policies based on snapshots of the network
view, as described in [19], [21], [22]. While this can not
prevent policy conflicts as they occur, the offline policy
checker can perform periodic in-depth analysis of the network
state against invariants. The aim of the offline policy checker
is to verify complementary network properties – such as
liveness and network reachability and tenant isolation – as well
as monitor the deployed network applications for malicious
activities. In this sense, the offline policy checker can perform
a role similar to that of an intrusion detection system, but with
a focus on detecting malicious policies.
Besides policy verification and enforcement, several addi-
tional aspects must be included in the framework in order to
create a trusted and secure SDN infrastructure. Such aspects
are: an access control model specifically designed to ensure
efficient sandboxing of network applications and isolation
between the different privilege levels; mechanisms for trusted
deployment of the infrastructure and enrollment of the data
plane devices; effective tenant isolation in multi-tenant SDN
deployments and strong quota enforcement for reliable and
fair distribution of resources among tenants.
V. CONCLUSION
In this position paper we have outlined the need for a
comprehensive approach towards SDN policy management –
including generation, verification and enforcement of network
policies. Such an approach must take into account policies
issued by the network operator, network applications and
the network controller. An overview of the existing solutions
shows that there has been steady progress over the years
from static network analysis, to real-time policy verification to
security-enforcement kernels and security-enhanced network
controllers. Nevertheless, a set of challenges persists, such as
verification of liveness properties during SDN policy verifi-
cation, inclusion of interleaved policy execution, eliminating
the risk for network isolation breaches without triggering
unsustainable volumes of false positives, identifying a suitable
privilege model that would enforce non-interference between
network applications without limiting network functionality
as well as defining an access control model for network
operating systems applicable to SDN deployments with a
minimal performance footprint.
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